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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1973 session of the Florida Legislature has produced land-
mark legislation relating to two of the most prevelant types of residen-
tial dwellings-rental apartments and mobile homes. Legislation in this
area is of particular importance to Florida's large transient population;
to new residents who may wish to permanently retire in a mobile home
community (or utilize such facilities or other rental accommodations
while seeking a more permanent home); and also to the myriad of young
adults upward bound and saving for their dream homes. It is the pur-
pose of this article to delineate the principal features of this legislation
and to emphasize the departures from former law.
* Acknowledgment is accorded the Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund for their annual con-
tributions which are used to stimulate research in Property Law.
** Professor of Law, University of Miami.
*** Digest Editor, University of Miami Law Review, Student Instructor in Freshman
Research and Writing I & II.
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II. FLORIDA RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT
A. Background And Coverage
The Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,' with certain exceptions,2
became effective on July 1, 1973.' The Act codifies many aspects of the
residential landlord-tenant relationship, substitutes modern contractual
principles for archaic conveyancing concepts, 4 and strikes a balance be-
tween the rights and obligations of the respective parties.
The Act parallels the recent trend in American law away from
the traditional property concepts in this area. The most glaring deficien-
cies in traditional law have been in areas where economic realities have
nullified the theoretical rights and remedies of indigent tenants living in
substandard housing. Both legislative and judicial awareness of these
problems has resulted in such innovations as the implication of a cove-
nant of habitability,5 the recognition of retaliation as a defense to an
eviction,6 utilization of the doctrines of apportionment and abatement
of rent,7 and the application of the concept of unconscionability.8
The Florida Act is not an all inclusive codification of the landlord-
tenant relationship in residential leases, but it does prescribe principal
features of the relationship and compensates, or at least tries to com-
pensate, for imbalances in the relative bargaining power of the parties.
It is not an indigent tenant's act as such, but, where applicable, it should
help considerably the indigent tenant living in substandard housing. It is
neither a tenant's nor a landlord's act, but rather a legislative attempt
to correct ascertained inequities and to strike a fair balance between
the parties.
The Act, by its terms, extends only to the rental of dwelling units
and mobile home lots.' Specifically excluded is residency or detention,
where such is incidental to the provision of medical, geriatric, educa-
1. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, creating FLA. STAT. §§ 83.40 et seq. [hereinafter referred
to as the Act].
2. F A. STAT. §§ 83.51, 83.56(1) (1973), imposing duties on the landlord to maintain
the premises and not violate any building, housing or health codes, and some ancillary sec-
tions dependant thereon, became effective on January 1, 1974. Those sections as to public
housing authorities will become effective as of July 1, 1975, but the other provisions of the
law became effective in regard to public housing on July 1, 1973. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330,
§ 15.
3. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-330, § 15.
4. The Hawaiian Act specifically states that one purpose of the act is to change the re-
lationship to one that is primarily contractual in nature. Hawaii Laws 1972, Act 132, § 2(3).
The Florida Act contains no such express provision.
5. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Kline v. Burns,
111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
6. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, (D.C. Cir. 1968); Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d
389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970). See also MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT
§ 2-407; Hawaii Laws 1972, Act 132, § 74.
7. See cases cited in note 5 supra; FLA. STAT. §§ 83.46 and 83.60(1) (1973).
8. FLA. STAT. § 83.45 (1973); Hawaii Laws 1972, Act 132, § 75.
9. FLA. STAT. § 83.41 (1973). For a more detailed analysis of recent statutory develop-
ments relating specifically to mobile home parks, see section III infra.
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tional, counseling or religious services."° Also excluded from coverage
are occupancies arising under a contract of sale, transient occupancy,
occupancy by a holder of a proprietary lease in a cooperative apart-
ment, and occupancy by an owner of a condominium unit."
B. Obligations and Remedies
1. TERMS IMPUTED IN EVERY LEASE BY OPERATION OF LAW
In order to streamline and equalize the law of landlord and tenant
relations, the Act has, to a degree, standardized all residential leases by
imputing certain terms and concepts and prohibiting others. At the out-
set, it imposes on every rental agreement an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement. 2 Good faith is defined as honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.1
3
This obligation of good faith could be used by the court to prevent
the landlord from unduly harassing the tenant, as, for example, by
gaining access to the premises at unreasonable times and at too frequent
intervals. Conversely, it could also be used against the tenant in the
situation where the tenant refuses and interferes with the landlord's rea-
sonable requests for access to examine the premises or to show them to
prospective tenants at the end of the term.
Another instance in which the good faith requirement could be uti-
lized would be where the motive of the landlord is questioned in attempt-
ing to evict the tenant. For example, as will be discussed later, the re-
quirement of good faith may be applied to restrain a retaliatory eviction.
The concept could be used to deny the landlord the right to evict the
tenant if it appeared that his sole reason for the eviction was to retaliate
because the tenant notified the housing authorities of a breach of hous-
ing regulations, or for some other bona fide assertion of a tenant's
rights.
Further, the concept of unconscionability has become a factor in
the enforcement of rental agreements. The question of unconscionability
is one for the court to decide as a matter of law. Upon a finding of un-
10. FLA. STAT. § 83.42 (1973). It is significant that under the "geriatric" exception, re-
tirement communities of a comprehensive character may not be within the scope of the Act.
11. Id. Of course, where, for example, the owner of a condominium unit is himself a
landlord, the Act comes into play. Where a single family home is rented, certain exceptions
apply as to the landlord's duties to maintain the premises. See section II, B, 2, a infra. A
clear problem of interpretation is presented, however, if a condominium unit is rented by
an individual owner through the rental agent of the condominium association and the use
of the agency is required by the condominium agreement. If all of the units so rented are to
be considered in total, the individual owner-landlord may lose his opportunity to avail
himself of the exceptions.
12. FLA. STAT. § 83.44 (1973). Similar provisions are found in Hawaii Laws 1972, Act
132, § 10.
13. Id. § 83.43(8). The requirement of good faith in the enforcement of the lease may
very well be the only protection present to the tenant in the face of a retaliatory eviction.
Also see text following note 95, infra.
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conscionability the court has three options; it may: (1) refuse to en-
force the entire rental agreement; (2) enforce the remainder of the
agreement without the unconscionable provision; or (3) limit the appli-
cation of any objectionable provision so as to avoid any unconscionable
result. 4
The Act takes an active role in policing rental agreements by pro-
hibiting, as void and unenforceable, any terms in a rental agreement
which purport to limit, waive, or preclude the assertion of rights, reme-
dies or requirements provided in the Act.' 5 If either party suffers actual
damage as a result of such a provision, the aggrieved party may recover
those damages.' 6 Thus, it would appear that an exculpatory clause pur-
porting to relieve the landlord from any liability arising from his statu-
tory and mandatory duties17 would be null and void. Moreover, an ex-
culpatory clause purporting to relieve either party of liability for or-
dinary negligence may likewise be void since the duty not to be negli-
gent "arise [s] by operation of law."' 8
Another "imputed term" in lease agreements provides that where
the lease allows the landlord attorney's fees in any action to enforce the
rental agreement, the court is given the option to award attorney's fees
to a successful tenant in any action by or against the tenant with respect
to the rental agreement. 19
The statutory imposition of attorney's fees should tend to equalize
the relative positions of the landlord and tenant. If only the landlord is
entitled to such fees, as the lease often provides, the tenant will be dis-
couraged from asserting his right because, even if successful, the cost of
the litigation may be in excess of his recovery. Now, since the tenant
knows that if he is successful he may recover attorney's fees, he may
also be more willing to assert his rights in court. Conversely, both par-
ties will be more reluctant to file frivolous or harrassing suits.
Thus, the Florida approach which makes the landlord's provision
for attorney's fees a "two-edged sword" appears to be a sound device.
Moreover, this approach is preferable to that taken under section 3-402
of the Model Residential Landlord and Tenant Code which expressly
denies attorney's fees to both parties. However, it would appear that
optimum recourse to rights protected under the Act would be gained by
14. FLA. STAT. § 83.45 (1973). It should be noted that this provision bears striking re-
semblance to FLA. STAT. § 672.302 (1973) (section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code),
which applies to transactions in goods. As the Act does not mention factors to be con-
sidered in determining unconscionability or which of the three options the court should adopt
in a given case, recourse to cases as well as the comments under section 672.302 may be
helpful. The Hawaiian provisions are remarkably similar. Hawaii Laws 1972, Act 132, § 75.
15. FLA. STAT. § 83.47 (1973).
16. Id. § 83.47(2) (1973).
17. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 83.51(1) (1973), delineated following note 21 inIra.
18. The Hawaiian Act expressly prohibits exculpatory clauses on behalf of the landlord
and renders such provisions void. Hawaii Laws 1972, Act 132, § 33.
19. FLA. STAT. § 83.48 (1973). It should be emphasized that such an award is not
mandatory, but the court is given an option in this regard.
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allowing attorney's fees to the prevailing party without dependence on
any provisions in the rental agreement.20
2. LANDLORD'S OBLIGATIONS AND TENANT'S REMEDIES
a. Landlord's Duties
In an attempt to curb the problem of the anonymous landlord, the
Florida Act provides that prior to the tenant's occupancy of the premises
the landlord must disclose in writing to the tenant the name and address
of the landlord or his representative authorized to receive notices and
demands. Moreover, in the case of construction of new buildings exceed-
ing three stories in height, the landlord must disclose to the initial ten-
ants whether or not fire protection is available.2 '
The duties or obligations of the landlord in regard to maintenance
of the leasehold premises are divided into two categories: the first, and
most important, is that the landlord must, at all times during the ten-
ancy, comply with the requirements of all applicable building, housing,
and health codes. When no such codes are applicable, all basic structural
and service components are to be kept in good repair and capable of re-
sisting normal forces and loads. The above duties, however, may be al-
tered with respect to a single family home or duplex if such modifica-
tions are put in writing. Also, the landlord is not required to maintain a
mobile home or other structure owned by the tenant.22
The second set of duties requires that the landlord make reason-
able provision for the extermination of rodents and insects, the supply
of locks and keys, the maintenance of clean and safe common areas,
garbage removal, heat, running water and hot water. However, the above
do not apply to the landlord of a single family home or duplex, and in
all other situations, may be modified in writing.2" It should be noted
that non-compliance with this second set of duties does not authorize
the tenant to raise such non-compliance as a defense to an action for
24possession.
20. MODEL RESmENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 2-407. The Florida Act also seems
preferable to that of Hawaii which authorizes the lease to provide for attorney's fees for the
landlord of up to 25% of the unpaid rent, and provides that the Office of Consumer Pro-
tection shall provide counsel for indigent tenants if counsel is otherwise unattainable. Hawaii
Laws 1972, Act 132, §§ 35, 76.
21. FLA. STAT. § 83.50 (1973).
22. Id. § 83.51(1). A similar approach is adopted in the Hawaiian Act with the land-
lord being responsible for complying with housing, health and similar codes. Hawaii Laws
1972, Act 132, § 42.
23. Id. § 83.51(2). It should be noted that the tenants may be charged for garbage
removal, water, fuel and utilities. But see FLA. STAT. § 83.281(7) (1971) renumbered
§ 83.70(7) (1973), which prohibits the supplying or selling of electricity or gas by a
mobile park owner at a price higher than that charged by the public utility from whom
the electricity or gas was purchased. This statute is discussed further in section 11I infra.
24. FLA. STAT. § 83.51(3) (1973). Further, if the first set of duties (concerning com-
pliance with health codes, etc.) is the same or greater than any duty imposed under the
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b. Tenant's Remedies
The statute expressly grants access to the courts in order to enforce,
by way of civil action, the duties and obligations created under the Flor-
ida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.2" It is also expressly provided
that where there is a failure to comply with the rental agreement or the
provisions of the statute, the aggrieved party may recover damages
caused by the non-compliance.26
Under the Act, the tenant may terminate the rental agreement if
the landlord fails to comply with the statutorily imposed duties relative
to building and housing codes or structural components, or if he other-
wise breaches material provisions of the rental agreement." To take ad-
vantage of this option, the tenant must serve a notice on the landlord
specifying such non-compliance, and indicating an intention to termi-
nate the rental agreement by reason thereof. The landlord thereafter has
seven days to remedy his default' and if he fails, the tenant may ter-
minate.
However, if the failure to comply with the statutory provisions of
the rental agreement are due to causes beyond the control of the land-
lord and he seriously attempts to comply, the rental agreement may be
terminated or modified by the parties as follows:
a) If the landlord's failure to comply renders the dwelling unten-
antable and the tenant vacates, the tenant shall not be liable for rent
during the period of uninhabitability;
b) If the tenant remains in occupancy and only part of the dwell-
ing unit is untenantable, the rent for the period of non-compliance shall
be reduced in proportion to the loss of rental value caused by such non-
compliance. 29
These statutory provisions appear to be somewhat of a modifica-
tion of the common law doctrine of constructive eviction or breach of
the covenant of quiet enjoyment."0 The initial statutory statement seems
to be substantially equivalent except that it clarifies the responsibilities
of both sides, especially with regard to the procedure for assertion of the
claims and opportunity to remedy the defects. When the defects are not
timely remedied, then the tenant may vacate and be excused from
further liability.
The second part of the provision, however, is troublesome. It states
second set of duties, then the landlord's duty is determined by the first set. FLA. STAT.
§ 83.51(4) (1973). See section II, B, 2 infra. That non-compliance with the first set of duties
is a defense to an action for possession, see text at note 36 infra.
25. FLA. STAT. § 83.54 (1973).
26. Id. § 83.55.
27. Id. § 83.51(1) imposes duties on the landlord, while § 83.56 allows the tenant to
terminate for non-compliance. See text following note 21 supra.
28. FLA. STAT. § 83.56(1) (1973).
29. Id.
30. See generally Richards v. Dodge, 150 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963); 2 R. BOYER,
FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION §§ 35.09[2], [3] (1973).
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that where the housing defects are beyond the control of the landlord,
then the parties may terminate or alter the agreement in one of two
ways.3 If, as the statute seems to indicate, such termination or modifi-
cation is dependent upon the mutual agreement of the parties, it may
be questionable whether it performs any function at all since the parties
would be free in any event to terminate or alter their agreement. The
only possible deterrent might be that the modification might lack con-
sideration, but presumably that could be overcome without too much
difficulty. In the case of a voluntary termination, the tenant is surrender-
ing his leasehold and the landlord is excusing him from further per-
formance. In the case of modification, the tenant is excusing the land-
lord from strict adherence to his statutory duties, and the landlord is
giving up some of his rent in return therefor.
If the options are meant to be mandatory or exclusive, then some
difficulty may result in their application. If the parties have not made
an express agreement as to one or the other, will such an agreement be
automatically applied once the court determines that there was non-
compliance by the landlord with his statutory duties, and that such
non-compliance was beyond his control? If so, and if the tenant vacates
and the landlord does not agree that the rental agreement has been
terminated, will subsection (a) be applied so that the tenant will be
excused only during the period of uninhabitability? If so, note the diffi-
culty of the tenant's position. Presumably, on repair of the premises,
the rental agreement revives and the tenant would have to move back
in or find another tenant. The statute does not provide for moving ex-
penses, increased rent that the tenant may have to pay for short term
accommodations elsewhere, or for possible damages to his personal ef-
fects as a result of the untenantable condition of the premises. After
repairs, the landlord would have to let the tenant return. Of course, if
the parties voluntarily agree to this procedure, neither has any complaint.
Under the subsection (b) alternative of the statute, if the tenant
remains in possession during the landlord's nonintentional failure to
comply with his duties, the tenant is liable only for a reduced rent. In
the event the parties do not expressly agree to this procedure nor to the
amount by which the rent should be reduced, the proper amount can be
determined in a subsequent suit, but as will be explained below,82 pre-
sumably the tenant will have to pay the whole rent into court as it comes
due in order to safeguard against a successful eviction suit by the land-
lord."8 This provision for an abatement of rent under these circum-
stances is certainly a departure from traditional landlord and tenant
concepts.
These statutory procedures in case of defects beyond the landlord's
31. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.56(1) (a),(b) (1973) ; see text following note 28 supra.
32. See text at note 40 inlra.
33. FLA. STAT. § 83.60(2) (1973).
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control are obviously meant to be fair to both parties, but they do raise
serious questions. If such procedures are applicable only when the parties
expressly agree to termination or modification, what happens when they
affirmatively disagree? If an agreement is to be implied from their con-
duct, when the tenant moves out, what criteria will determine whether
they agreed to terminate or simply agreed to excuse the tenant from
rental liability during the period of uninhabitability? Further legislative
consideration of these procedures may be in order.
This statutory remedy whereby the tenant may stay in possession
without paying rent, or at least without paying all of the rent stipulated
in the agreement, appears to be a statutory incorporation of the cove-
nant of habitability implied recently in other jurisdictions. 4 Breach of
the landlord's duties giving rise to this remedy are those mandatory
duties prescribed by applicable health, safety and building, or housing
codes. Similar duties have likewise constituted the basis of the implied
covenant of habitability in other jurisdictions with similar results.3 5 The
fact that the tenant may stay without paying rent, or with paying a re-
duced rent, treats this implied covenant as dependent rather than inde-
pendent. The imposition of a duty to pay reasonable rental value when
the premises are not totally untenantable sounds in quantum meruit or
quasi-contract. It may also be noted that the statutory provision requir-
ing the tenant in possession to pay into court any rents that may be
ascertained3 6 is analogous to the "rent strikes" allowed in some juris-
dictions.3
It should also be noted at this point that both the landlord and
tenant waive their rights to terminate the rental agreement or to bring
a civil action for non-compliance, should either party accept or pay rent
to the other party with knowledge of any non-compliance. This waiver,
however, does not affect any subsesquent or continuing non-compliance.38
A significant departure from common law principles is the pro-
vision that the tenant may raise the defense of the landlord's material
non-compliance with mandatory duties 9 in actions brought by the land-
lord to recover possession or unpaid rent.4  As above stated,41 however,
the defense of material non-compliance may only be raised if seven days
have elapsed after delivery of written notice by the tenant to the land-
lord specifying such non-compliance, and indicating an intent not to
pay rent by reason thereof. 2
34. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Kline v. Burns,
111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
35. See cases cited note 42 supra.
36. FLA. STAT. § 83.60(2) (1973).
37. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACT. & Paoc. LAW § 755 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
38. FLA. STAT. § 83.56(5) (1973).
39. Id. § 83.51(1). However, the landlord's failure to comply with the duties enumerated
in subsection (2) of the statute cannot be asserted as a defense to an action for possession.
40. FLA. STAT. § 83.60(1) (1973).
41. See text following note 28 supra.
42. FLA. STAT. § 83.60(1) (1973).
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A material non-compliance with such statutory duties is a complete
defense to an action for possession based on non-payment of rent, but,
upon hearing, the court or jury shall determine the amount, if any, by
which the rent is to be reduced to reflect the diminution in value of the
rental unit. 8 When the tenant asserts any defense other than payment
to a possessory action based on non-payment of rent, the tenant shall
pay into the registry of the court the accrued and accruing rent as al-
leged in the complaint or as determined by the court.44 Failure of the
tenant to pay rent into the registry of the court constitutes an absolute
waiver of the tenant's defenses other than payment, and the landlord is
entitled to an immediate default. 5
3. TENANT'S OBLIGATIONS AND LANDLORD'S REMEDIES
a. Tenant's Duties
The Act has set forth minimum standards in the maintenance and
use of the rental unit by the tenant. Specifically, the tenant must:
(1) comply with all obligations imposed upon him by applicable hous-
ing, building and health codes; (2) keep his dwelling unit clean and
sanitary; (3) keep all plumbing fixtures in the dwelling unit clean, sani-
tary and in repair; (4) remove from his dwelling unit all garbage;
(5) use and operate all facilities and appliances in a reasonable manner;
(6) refrain from destroying or in any way damaging any property be-
longing to the landlord; and (7) conduct himself and require others on
the premises with his consent to conduct themselves in a reasonable
manner.
46
b. Landlord's Remedies
As was stated above,47 the rights and duties expressed in the statute
are enforceable by civil action, and failure to comply with the rental
agreement or the provisions of the statute establishes a cause of action
for damages arising from such non-compliance.48 The landlord may also
elect to terminate the rental agreement if the tenant materially fails to
comply with his statutory duties or with material provisions of the lease.4"
43. Id.
44. Id. § 83.60(2).
45. Id. The landlord may apply to the court for disbursement of all or part of the funds
or for prompt, final hearing when the landlord is in danger of losing the premises or suffering
other personal hardship resulting from loss of income. FLA. STAT. § 83.63 (1973).
46. FLA. STAT. § 83.52 (1973). Similar provisions are found in Hawaii Laws 1972, Act
132, § 51.
47. See notes 25 & 26 supra and accompanying text.
48. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.54, .55 (1973). Cf. Hawaii Laws 1972, Act 132, § 69, where, among
other remedies, the landlord is authorized to correct the tenant's delinquencies and bill him
for the reasonable cost thereof, such bill to be treated as rent due and payable on the next
regular rent collection date, or if the tenancy has terminated, immediately upon receipt by
the tenant.
49. FLA. STAT. § 83.56(2) (1973).
1973]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
The prerequisite procedures to an election to terminate are clearly
delineated in the statute. If the tenant's breach is based on a failure to
pay rent when due, and the default continues for three days after deliv-
ery of written demand by the landlord for payment of rent or possession
of the premises, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement. 0
In the case of a material breach other than failure to pay rent, the
landlord may terminate the agreement only after serving written notice
specifying the non-compliance and indicating an intention to terminate
the agreement. The notice must give the tenant seven days in which to
remedy the default."'
The landlord may recover possession of the dwelling unit from a
tenant holding over after the expiration of the rental agreement without
the permission of the landlord. 2 Further, the landlord may recover
double the amount of rent due for the period in which the tenant refuses
to surrender possession."2 The eviction procedure is delineated in the stat-
utes. When the rental agreement is terminated and the tenant does not
vacate, the landlord may recover possession by filing with the county
court in the county where the premises are located a complaint describ-
ing the dwelling unit and the facts that authorize its recovery."4 The
landlord is entitled to the statutory summary procedure,"6 and the court
may advance the cause on the calendar.
The landlord is restricted from recovering possession of a dwelling
unit except: (a) in an action for possession under the Act, or in other
civil action in which the issue of right of possession is determined;
(b) when the tenant has surrendered possession to the landlord; or
(c) when the tenant has abandoned the dwelling unit. As to abandon-
ment, the statutes raises a presumption in favor of the landlord, that,
in the absence of actual knowledge of abandonment, the tenant has aban-
doned if he is absent from the premises for a period of time equal to
one-half the time for periodic rental payments. However, such presump-
50. Id. § 83.56(3).
51. Id. § 83.56(2). Cf. Hawaii Laws 1972, Act 132, § 69, where the notice to terminate
under similar conditions must allow the tenant not less than thirty days to comply with
his obligations.
52. FLA. STAT. § 83.58 (1973).
53. Id. A similar provision is applicable to the now commercial landlord and tenant
section. FLA. STAT. § 83.06 (1973). It should also be noted that section 83.06 was construed
as not authorizing the recovery of double rent when the tenant held over in good faith
believing he had a right to do so. Painter v. Town of Groveland, 79 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1955).
In all probability, this statute would be similarly construed.
The Hawaiian Act limits the recovery of double rent to one month, and thereafter the
tenant's liability is limited to the monthly rent under the previous agreement. It is also
provided that the landlord's acceptance of rent in advance after the first month's holdover
shall create a month-to-month tenancy in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.
Hawaii Laws 1972, Act 132, § 71(c).
54. FLA. STAT. § 83.59 (1973).
55. Id. § 55.011. The procedure is the same as that provided for the eviction of com-
mercial tenants. FLA. STAT. § 83.21 (1973) (except that the county court is specifically
designated as the proper court). See note 58 infra and accompanying text.
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tion does not apply if the rent is current or if the tenant has notified
the landlord of an intended absence."8 The prevailing party is entitled
to have judgment for costs and execution in an eviction proceeding.57
Upon entry of judgment in favor of the landlord in an action for
possession, the clerk shall issue to the sheriff a writ describing the prem-
ises and ordering him to put the landlord in possession twenty-four hours
after notice has been posted conspicuously on the premises.58 With regard
to mobile homes, the writ shall not be issued prior to thirty days from
the service of the complaint upon the tenant.59
4. LANDLORD'S ACCESS TO THE DWELLING UNIT
In hopes of resolving what must be considered a particularly sensi-
tive area of landlord-tenant relationships, the Florida Residential Land-
lord and Tenant Act prescribes rules and regulations governing the land-
lord's right of access during the tenancy. The Act provides that the ten-
ant shall not unreasonably withhold consent to the landlord to enter the
dwelling unit from time to time to inspect and maintain the premises,
supply agreed services, or exhibit the premises to prospective or actual
purchasers, tenants, workmen, or the like."°
Where entry by the landlord is for the above stated purposes, such
entry may be had: (1) with the consent of the tenant; (2) in the case
of emergency; and (3) when the tenant unreasonably withholds consent.
In addition, the landlord may enter when the tenant is absent from the
premises for a period of time equal to one-half the time for periodic
rental payments; however, when the landlord is notified by the tenant
of an intended absence, and if the rent is current, the landlord may enter
only with the permission of the tenant or for the protection and preser-
vation of the premises.6" The landlord is given a statutory right to enter
the dwelling unit at any time for the protection and preservation of the
premises.62 The landlord is cautioned, however, that his right of access
56. FLA. STAT. § 83.59(3) (1973).
57. Id. § 83.59(4). As to the court which has jurisdiction in eviction cases: Article V,
section 5, of the Florida Constitution, as amended in 1972, provides that the circuit courts
shall have original jurisdiction not vested in the county courts, and section 6 provides that
the county courts shall exercise the jurisdiction prescribed by general law. FLA. STAT. § 26.012
(Supp. 1972), inter alia, confers exclusive original jurisdiction on circuit courts: "In all
actions involving the title, boundaries, or right of possession of real property." (emphasis
added). FLA. STAT. § 34.011 (Supp. 1972), provides that the county court shall have con-
current jurisdiction with the circuit court to consider landlord and tenant cases involving
claims in amounts which are within its jurisdictional limitations ($2,500). FLA. STAT.
§ 83.59(2) (1973), specifies only the county court for eviction of residential tenants.
58. FLA. STAT. § 83.62 (1973).
59. Id.
60. FLA. STAT. § 83.53(1) (1973).
61. Id. § 83.53(2).
62. Id. The landlord is not given such a carte blanche right under the Hawaiian law,
and under that act generally must give the tenant two days notice of his intent to enter.
See generally Hawaii Laws 1972, Act 132, §§ 53, 70(b).
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shall not be abused, nor used to harass the tenant.6" As the Act is silent
as to the right of the parties to extend or modify their statutory rights
or obligations in this regard, presumably the statute would prevail over
contrary provisions in the rental agreement.
C. Rent and Duration of the Tenancies
1. RENT
Under the Act, unless otherwise agreed, rental payments for resi-
dential units are payable without notice or demand; periodic rent is pay-
able at the beginning of each rent payment period; and rent is uniformly
apportionable from day to day.64 The provisions for payment at the be-
ginning of the period and apportionment are departures from traditional
common law concepts, but are in accord with modern-day practices and
concepts of fairness. Most rental agreements do, in fact, provide for pay-
ment at the beginning of the period, and apportionment in housing rent-
als appears justified where the rental agreement may be terminated be-
tween rental periods, especially if the termination is the fault of neither
party, or at the fault of one seeking an advantage from the time of pay-
ments. Moreover, housing units are by their character an easily saleable
market commodity, and vacancies can be turned over quickly, in con-
trast to commercial units which may require extensive negotiations and
alterations in order to be turned over.
The provisions as to duration of the tenancy, where the rental agree-
ment contains no provision as to duration, are similar to the Florida
statutory tenancies at will 5 in that the duration is determined by the
provisions for which the rent is payable. If the rent is payable weekly,
then the tenancy is from week to week; if payable monthly, then from
month to month; if payable quarterly, then from quarter to quarter;
and if payable yearly, then from year to year.66
In addition to the remedies of the landlord previously discussed,O
a further remedy is provided according the landlord a lien for accrued
rent on all personal property of the tenant located on the premises.s
The lien is in addition to any other the landlord may acquire by law,
but may be modified or waived, in whole or part, by the provisions of a
written rental agreement. The head of a family is, of course, entitled
to a $1,000 personal property homestead exemption, and it is expressly
provided that the statute does not authorize any greater exemption than
63. FLA. STAT. § 83.53(3) (1973).
64. Id. § 83.46(1) (1973). Somewhat comparable provisions are contained in Hawaii
Laws 1972, Act 132, § 21.
65. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.01, .02 (1973).
66. Id. § 83.46(2).
67. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
68. FLA. STAT. § 713.691 (1973).
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that provided by the Florida constitution.69 The traditional remedy of
distress for rent has been abolished with respect to residential tenancies.70
2. DURATION AND TERMINATION OF INDEFINITE TENANCIES
Either party may terminate a tenancy which has no specific dura-
tion by delivering a written notice to the other. 71 The requirements for
such delivery are set forth in the statute and are the same for delivering
notice under other statutory sections.72 The minimum length of notice is
as follows: (a) sixty days prior to the end of any annual period when
the tenancy is from year to year; (b) thirty days prior to the end of any
quarterly period when the tenancy is from quarter to quarter; (c) fif-
teen days prior to the end of any monthly period when the tenancy is
from month to month, and (d) seven days prior to end of any weekly
period when the tenancy is from week to week.78
D. Security Deposits and Advanced Rental Payments
1. LANDLORD'S DUTIES
The problematic area of security deposits and advanced rental pay-
ments has again been reformed by the Florida Legislature, the former
statute74 regulating such deposits having been amended, renumbered
and incorporated into the new residential landlord and tenant code.78
In regard to the manner of holding such deposits, the statute applies to
both deposits as security for performance of the rental agreement, and
to advanced rent which is held in excess of three months by the land-
69. Id. § 713.691(2). The homestead exemption is found in FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
70. FLA. STAT. § 713.691(3) (1973). The distress remedy as provided was possibly
unconstitutional as a denial of procedural due process in that it allowed the landlord to seize
the tenant's chattels without notice or hearing. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972),
dealing with replevin; Stroemer v. Shevin, No. 72-1627-CIV-WM (S.D. Fla. 1973), spe-
cifically dealing with FLA. STAT. §§ 83.08-.19 (1971); Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183
(S.D. Fla. 1972), dealing with FLA. STAT. §§ 713.67-.69 (1971), discussed by Wisotsky, 46
FLA. B.J. 605 (1972); MacQueen v. Lambert, 348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972), dealing
with FLA. STAT. §§ 713.67-.69 (1971). But see Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So.
2d 617 (Fla. 1973). The summary procedure authorized by the Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act now provides for notice and hearing. FLA. STAT. § 85.011(5) (1973).
71. FLA. STAT. § 83.57 (1973).
72. The manner prescribed for giving notice is contained in FLA. STAT. § 83.56(4) (1973).
73. FLA. STAT. § 83.57 (1973). It may be noted that the minimum period for giving
notice to terminate residential tenancies is shortened from that applicable to non-residential
tenancies in the instances of year-to-year and quarter-to-quafter lettings. Under the general
statute applicable to statutory tenancies at will, FLA. STAT. § 83.03 (1973), there is required
a three months' notice to terminate a year-to-year rental, and a forty-five days' notice to
terminate a quarter-to-quarter leasing. The minimum notice required to terminate a month-
to-month or weeek-to-week letting is the same under both statutes.
74. FLA. STAT. § 83.261 (Supp. 1972). This statute has been criticized as being un-
workable in application.
75. FLA. STAT. § 83.49 (1973).
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lord or his agent.76 The total of such sums shall either be held in a separ-
ate account for the benefit of the tenants and not commingled with funds
of the landlord, or the landlord shall post a surety bond with the clerk
of the circuit court in an amount equal to the total of the security de-
posits and advanced rent or fifty thousand dollars, whichever is less.77
Whenever the deposit, or advanced rent, is held in excess of six
months, the deposit or advanced rent shall accumulate interest at the
rate of five percent simple interest. 78 However, no interest shall be re-
quired when the moneys are held in a separate account for the benefit
of the tenants and not commingled with funds of the landlord, and the
landlord does not pledge or in any way make use of such moneys until
they are actually due him. If, on the other hand, such funds are depos-
ited in an interest-bearing account, the account must be in a Florida
banking institution, and the landlord must notify the tenant of the iden-
tity of the bank. The tenant shall be entitled to seventy-five percent of
the interest payable in lieu of the payment of the five percent interest
otherwise payable by the landlord. The landlord is required, within thir-
ty days of the receipt of the advanced rent or security deposit, to notify
the tenant of the rate of interest, if any, which the tenant is to receive.
The landlord is further required to pay or credit the interest to the
tenant at least once annually. 79
Upon vacating the premises pursuant to termination of the lease,
the landlord has fifteen days to either return the security deposit with
any accrued interest, or to give the tenant written notice by certified
mail of his intention to impose a claim against the deposit. The form of
notice is prescribed in the statute, and substantial compliance is sufficient.
Failure of the landlord to give such notice forfeits his right to impose a
claim upon the security deposit.8"
The tenant, after receipt of notice by the landlord of an intent to
impose a claim on the security, has fifteen days to object, and if he does
not, the landlord may then deduct the amount of the claim and remit
the balance of the deposit to the tenant. If either party institutes an
action to adjudicate his rights to the security deposit, the prevailing
party is entitled to court costs plus reasonable attorney's fees.8 '
76. Id. § 83.49(1).
77. Id. The statute further provides that the bond shall be conditioned upon faithful
compliance by the landlord and shall run to the governor for the benefit of any tenant
injured by the landlord's violation of his duties with regard to such deposits.
78. FLA. STAT. § 83.49(2) (1973).
79. Id.
80. Id. § 83.49(3).
81. Id. The award of costs and attorney's fees is probably an essential requirement to
allow a tenant to assert his rights to the security deposit as such costs and fees would
almost invariably exceed the amount in controversy. However, due to the transient nature
of the Florida population, the requirement that a dispute be resolved only after termination
of the lease may preclude institution of suit by the tenant for practical reasons if the
tenant intends to move any distance from the county in which the rental premises are
located. An alternative to alleviate this problem might be to allow a suit to declare the
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2. SECURITY DEPOSITS AND ADVANCED RENTALS-
DISTINGUISHED OR ASSIMILATED?
It may be significant that the above discussed statute, in prescribing
the manner in which the landlord shall keep the tenants' deposits, uses
concepts of both security deposits and advanced rentals, 2 but that in
detailing the procedure for the return of said deposit, uses only the term
security deposit.88 Traditionally, advanced rentals are not recoverable
by a defaulting or abandoning tenant,84 but security deposits in excess of
any damage occasioned by the tenant are returned after the tenancy
is terminated. Thus, it is conceivable that the detailed statutory pro-
cedure for the return of the security deposits relates only to security as
such, and if a tenant abandons before that time and has paid advanced
rent, as, for example, rent for the twelfth month, he will be unable to
recover such advanced rent. It is submitted, however, that such result
appears at least somewhat inconsistent with other provisions of the Act.
These other provisions are: that rent is uniformly apportionable; s5 that
each party has an obligation of good faith, 6 which possibly includes an
obligation of the landlord to relet the premises to mitigate damages; and,
that unconscionable provisions will not be enforced, 7 possibly meaning
that payment of rent for a period of time the tenant does not occupy
the premises is unconscionable. Also, the fact that the legislature has
placed advanced rental payments into the same category as security
deposits for the purpose of protecting the tenant's rights may indicate
an intent to treat both equally for all purposes even though the pro-
visions as to return of deposits refers only to security.
3. EXCEPTIONS
The provisions concerning security deposits do not apply to tran-
sient rentals by hotels or motels, nor to those instances where the amount
parties' rights to the security deposit at some period before termination of the rental
agreement. However, the landlord would then be at the mercy of the tenant who, after
getting a return of his security, might feel free to damage the premises.
82. FLA. STAT. § 83.49(1),(2) (1973).
83. Id. § 83.49(3).
84. Wagner v. Rice, 97 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1957); Casino Amusement Co. v. Ocean Beach
Amusement Co., 101 Fla. 59, 133 So. 559 (1931) ; Paul v. Kanter, 172 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 3d.
Dist. 1965).
Much ingenuity has been exercised in the phrasing of the clauses of leases
dealing with such funds. The basic function and justification of such a fund is to
provide security for the lessor that the lessee will discharge his agreed obligations.
... These efforts have had little success when the wording of "liquidated damages"
has been used; have been recognized as effectiv in a minority of states when the
"consideration for the execution of the lease" phraseology has been employed; and
have been most effective when made in the form of "advance payments of rent."
2 R. PowELL, REAL PROPERTY, ff 231[2] (1973) (footnotes omitted).
85. FLA. STAT. § 83.46(1) (1973); note 64 supra and accompanying text.
86. Fa. STAT. § 83.44 (1973); note 12 supra and accompanying text.
87. FLA. STAT. § 83.45 (1973) ; note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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of rent, deposit or both, is regulated by law or regulations of a public
body (other than for rent stabilization). Further, the provisions relating
to interest on the deposit do not apply to any landlord who rents fewer
than five individual dwelling units.88
E. Problem Areas and Possible Sources of Friction
1. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
The Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act has left largely
untouched several areas of the previous law. One such area concerns
the validity of, and distinction between, stipulations for damages and
deposits for security. It appears that the legislature has left to the judi-
ciary the determination of whether a particular deposit operates as a
penalty, a valid provision for liquidated damages, or a fund out of
which actual damages may be recovered.89 Since no provision in the Act
deals specifically with this problem, presumably the former law governs.
Once again, however, the semantic distinction between advanced rental
payments and security deposits has been retained. 90
2. ABANDONMENT OR SURRENDER-LANDLORD'S OPTIONS
Under Florida law, a landlord has four options in the event the
lessee fails to pay rent and abandons possession: (1) he may accept a
surrender of the leasehold, terminate the lease, relieve the tenant of all
further obligations, and resume possession for his own purposes; (2) he
may repossess for the account of the lessee and hold him for any dam-
ages occasioned by the abandonment and reletting; (3) he may let the
premises remain idle and sue the tenant for each rent installment as it
comes due, or sue for the entire amount when it is matured; or (4) he
may sue for anticipatory breach of contract.9 It is to be noted that under
the third option above the landlord has no duty to mitigate damages.
This seemingly inequitable result has not been expressly changed by the
Act, but, such provisions as good faith and unconscionability might elim-
inate that option.92
88. FLA. STAT. § 83.49(4), (5) (1973).
89. As to the distinctions and general treatment, see Kanter v. Safran, 68 So. 2d 553
(Fla. 1953) ; 82 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1955), 99 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1958) ; Paul v. Kanter, 172 So.
2d 26 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) ; Platt v. Mannheimer, 124 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960);
Boyer & Ross, Real Property Law, 18 U. MIAmi L. REV. 848 (1963); 2 R. BOYER, FLA.
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, §§ 36.14-.16 (1970). Compare note 84 supra and accompanying
text.
90. In addition to the distinction noted in the text following note 81 supra advanced
rent is defined in FLA. STAT. § 83.43(9) (1973), and deposit money is defined in FLA. STAT.
§ 83.43(11) (1973).
91. Kanter v. Safran, 68 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1953); 2 R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS § 36.18 (1970) and cases cited therein.
92. See note 85 supra and accompanying text, for a discussion of the possible effect of
the act on advanced rental payments.
RESIDENTIAL LEASING ACT
3. EXCULPATORY CLAUSES
It appears clear from a reading of the statute that exculpatory
clauses that attempt to relieve the landlord from liability, at least with
regard to non-performance of his mandatory statutory duties, will be held
void." Exculpatory clauses relating to negligence on the part of the land-
lord or his agents would appear to be invalid as well. 4 It should also be
noted that any exculpatory clause may be challenged on the grounds of
unconscionability. 5
4. RETALIATORY EVICTION
Under the Act, the existence of any building, housing or health code
violation plays a major role in determining the relative rights and obli-
gations of the landlord and tenant." The legislature has not, however,
provided what may be considered an adequate tool for effective enforce-
ment of the various codes. No provision is expressly formulated prohibit-
ing eviction because the tenant has reported such violations to the au-
thorities.
The importance of providing such protection has been aptly stated
by Judge Skelly Wright in Edwards v. Habib:
The notion that the effectiveness of remedial legislation
will be inhibited if those reporting violations of it can legally
be intimidated is so fundamental that a presumption against
the legality of such intimidation can be inferred as inherent in
the legislation even if it is not expressed in the statute itself.97
In addition to such rationale, it is believed that the Act, as pre-
viously suggested,9" does have sufficiently flexible provisions to enable
the courts to outlaw strictly retaliatory measures regardless of the rea-
sons giving rise to the retaliation.
III. MOBILE HOME PARKS
A. Introduction
Abuses in the operation of mobile home parks and the rental of
lots therein led to the enactment of remedial legislation in 1972." 9 Such
legislation, however, did not go far enough; therefore, it was amended,
supplemented and incorporated into the Residential Landlord and Ten-
ant Act of 1973. The legislation tends to equalize the relative position
93. FLA. STAT. § 83.47(1)(a) (1973). See also note 17 supra and accompanying text.
94. FLA. STAT. § 83.47(1) (b) (1973); note 18 supra and accompanying text.
95. FLA. STAT. § 83.45.
96. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 83.51, .56, 92.40 (1973).
97. 397 F.2d 687, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
98. See text following note 19 supra.
99. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.271, .281, .291 (Supp. 1972).
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of the park owner and dweller, outlaws specific unfair practices, regu-
lates eviction matters, and creates specific remedies.
B. Grounds for Eviction
Under the 1972 statute, the mobile home park owner was entitled
to evict a dweller for three reasons: (1) nonpayment of rent; (2) viola-
tion of some federal, state or local law detrimental to the safety and wel-
fare of the other dwellers in the park; or (3) violation of any rule or
regulation of the mobile home park owner.100 These grounds are retained
but, under the new Act, in order to evict a dweller, a conviction of a vio-
lation of applicable law is required, or if the eviction is based on viola-
tion of an "owner rule," the rule must withstand the test of reasonable-
ness.'' A fourth ground for eviction is provided for in the Act. Where a
change in the use of the land of the mobile home lot is planned, the park
owner may evict the dweller so long as the dweller is given at least
ninety days notice of the need for him to secure other accommodations. 0 2
C. Restrictions on Disposal of Mobile Homes
Under the 1972 law, a mobile home park owner could not require
the dweller to remove the mobile home from the park solely on the basis
of the sale of the home. However, the park owner was permitted the
right to approve the new purchaser so long as the permission was not
unreasonably withheld.' ° These provisions remain substantially un-
changed under the Act, but, if for any reason the park owner refuses to
permit the dweller to sell to a qualified buyer after three bona fide offers,
the next offer may be accepted as a matter of course.'
D. Requirements of Entry
Three major remedial provisions to correct abuses have been in-
cluded in the Act. First, a prospective tenant shall not be required to
1O. Id.
101. FLA. STAT. § 83.271(1) (Supp. 1972), renumbered § 83.69 (1973). As to what may
be termed as reasonable, the Act states:
A mobile home park rule or regulation shall be presumed to be reasonable if it is
similar to rules and regulations customarily established in other mobile home parks
located in this state or if the rule or regulation is not immoderate or excessive.
Id. (emphasis added).
If the above provision is construed to mean that the regulation may satisfy either of
the two tests, then it would appear that concerted efforts on the part of owners to establish
a particular inequitable regulation would be successful. In view of the fact that many regu-
lations prohibited in the Act were matters of common practice, the value of the above
provision would be nullified. Hopefully, the court will invalidate an immoderate or exces-
sive regulation, however commonplace.
102. FLA. STAT. § 83.271(1)(d) (Supp. 1972), renumbered § 83.69 (1973).
103. FLA. STAT. § 83.291 (Supp. 1972).
104. FLA. STAT. § 83.291 (Supp. 1972), renumbered § 83.71 (1973). A "qualified buyer"
RESIDENTIAL LEASING ACT
make any permanent improvements that become a part of the real prop-
erty of the park as a condition of entry into the park.'01 Second, the Act
provides for a schedule for the return of entry fees where the dweller's
occupancy is less than two years in duration.' Third, the Act pro-
hibits the resale of electricity or gas by the owner to the dweller at a
rate higher than that charged by the public utility from which the elec-
tricity or gas was purchased.0 7 All three provisions are designed to cor-
rect specific abuses.
E. Judicial Remedies
1. CIVIL REMEDY
A mobile home owner or dweller is authorized by statute to maintain
an action for damages for violation of the Act's provisions relating to
eviction, restrictions on disposal and entry requirements. Equitable re-
lief, where appropriate, may be granted, and costs and attorney's fees
may be awarded to the prevailing party in the discretion of the court.'
2. INJUNCTION
In addition to any other remedies available for violation of the pro-
visions of the Act, the state attorney may, upon sworn affidavit of any
park owner or dweller alleging a violation of the provisions relating to
eviction, disposition or entry, petition for an injunction restraining any
further violations. The right to an injunction does not depend upon an
existing adequate remedy at law, and the injunction may, in the court's
discretion, issue without bond. 09
The Act also creates standards for minimum tie-down requirements
for mobile homes.10 However, the technical requirements are beyond
the scope of this article.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and the legislation relat-
ing to mobile home parks, collectively constitute a significant step in
better protecting a large segment of the population which is least able
to protect itself. The general act attempts a delicate balance between the
rights of the landlord and tenant respectively, while the mobile home
provisions appear more directed at specific abuses. No doubt partisan
appears to mean one who would "qualify with the requirements of entry into the park
under the park rules and regulations."
105. FLA. STAT. § 83.281(5) (Supp. 1972), renumbered § 83.70(5) (1973).
106. FLA. STAT. § 83.281(6) (Supp. 1972), renumbered § 83.70(6) (1973).
107. FLA. STAT. § 83.281(7) (Supp. 1972), renumbered § 83.70(7) (1973).
108. FLA. STAT. § 83.301 (1973).
109. Id. § 83.311.
110. Id. § 320.8325.
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proponents of either the landlord or the tenant, or the park operator or
of the mobile home owner can find alleged defects in substance or draft-
ing, and can forcefully argue that certain statutes either go too far, or
not far enough, in a particular direction. Be that as it may, the legisla-
tion is a noble accomplishment. There must be a beginning, and if noth-
ing else, this is a rather comprehensive beginning away from encrusted
traditional thinking of conveyancing and estates in rental housing where
the consuming tenant is primarily interested in obtaining a package of
goods and services, really livable accomodations for a temporary or in-
definite period, and not an eternal estate to establish a family dynasty.
If the legislation is found wanting in the testing of time, and if the judi-
cial constructions are out of harmony or prove unsatisfactory, there is
always the opportunity for subsequent amendments. In the meantime,
the right step has been taken to conform residential leasings to modern
needs.
